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Abstract: 
Research shows that many animal species have morphological and cognitive 
adaptations for fighting with others to gain resources, but it remains unclear how humans 
make fighting decisions. Non-human animals often adaptively calibrate fighting behavior 
to ecological variables such as resource quantity and whether the resource is distributed 
uniformly or clustered in patches. Also, many species use strategies to reduce fighting 
costs such as resolving disputes based on power asymmetries or conventions. Here we 
show that humans apply an ownership convention in response to the problem of severe 
fighting. We designed a virtual environment where ten participants, acting as avatars, 
could forage and fight for electronic food items (convertible to cash). In the patchy 
condition, we observed an ownership convention—the avatar who arrives first is more 
likely to win—but in the uniform condition, where severe fighting is rare, the ownership 
convention is absent. 
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Introduction 
 A wealth of theoretical and empirical research in evolutionary biology addresses 
how animals interact with respect to resources such as territory, food, or mates (Brown, 
1964; Kokko, Lopez-Sepulcre, A., & Morrell, L. J., 2006; Maher & Lott, 2000; Maynard 
Smith, 1982; Parker, 1974). Broadly, this research shows that many animals make 
nuanced and adaptive decisions about whether, and how intensely, to fight others to 
secure a resource. Investigations of territorial behavior have identified as many as twenty 
ecological variables that affect decisions about whether to fight, including food quantity, 
food distribution, population density, and predation levels (Maher & Lott, 2000). Another 
line of research has discovered that when fights do occur, animals use a variety of 
strategies to reduce the costs such as fighting assessment (Parker, 1974) and conventions 
(Maynard Smith, 1982). However, despite a large literature on fighting in non-human 
animals—including mammals, birds, fish, and insects—little is known about how humans 
make fighting decisions.  
 Several scholars have applied theories from biology to understand how humans 
secure resources, deriving novel conclusions relevant to economics and property law 
(Gintis, 2007; Krier, 2009; Stake, 2004). These accounts particularly draw on Maynard 
Smith’s (1982) concept of a fighting convention or an “uncorrelated asymmetry” in 
which animal fights are resolved based on an asymmetry that is uncorrelated with 
fighting ability. Maynard Smith’s analysis led to the counterintuitive conclusion that 
animal fights can be more than battles of brawn: Choosing whether to fight or flee based 
on a conventional asymmetry, such as prior possession, can be an evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) because individuals thereby reduce fighting costs relative to others who 
ignore the convention. In humans, resource disputes are decided by more than sheer 
power, and hence, the strategic convention model could potentially explain the 
foundations of human property. However, no previous research has tested this hypothesis 
in humans using the standard experimental methods applied to non-human species. 
 The idea that human property is rooted in an individually advantageous strategic 
convention contradicts much of the received wisdom on the subject. Scholars throughout 
history have offered theories of property which hinge on verbal communication, 
individual reputation, productive labor, legal institutions, enforcement by authority, and 
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other complexities of human social life (Bentham, 1802; Grotius, 1625; Hobbes, 1647; 
Hume, 1740; Kant, 1797; Locke, 1689; Pufendorf, 1672; Rousseau, 1762). If, instead, 
basic features of human property can arise from very simple pairwise conflicts, as in 
species with minimal social interaction, then ownership reflects a core human 
competency which does not depend on advanced social abilities such as language, 
reputation, or third-party enforcement.  
 
A Virtual Environment for Disputes 
 We test whether human fighting decisions are sensitive to resource distribution 
(uniform or patchy), asymmetries in power, and asymmetries in prior possession. We 
designed custom software to create a virtual environment for observing human resource 
disputes (see Methods). In each experimental session, ten participants operate avatars in a 
virtual environment where they can forage and fight for food items which are convertible 
to cash (Supplementary Video 1). To secure resources, participants can “strike” each 
other, which, implemented through avatars, causes financial losses but not physical harm 
(Figure 1). This allows us to use methods similar to those used in non-human animal 
studies where animals engage in actual fighting. In the environment, avatars can move to 
find shrubs, enter/exit shrubs, and consume berries inside shrubs. Avatars gain one 
“health point” for each berry consumed, increasing their health meter (0-100 points) and 
offsetting health losses from metabolism which occurs at a rate of -10 points per minute. 
Participants’ cash earnings accumulate continuously in proportion to the health of their 
avatars, providing financial incentives to maximize health. When two avatars enter the 
same shrub, they have an “interaction” in which each avatar can (1) Leave, allowing the 
other avatar to consume berries, (2) Smile, which produces a smile, or (3) Strike, which 
costs the striker one health point and imposes a greater cost (3 or 5 points) on the 
individual who is struck. Participants remain in the interaction, where they can smile or 
strike repeatedly, until one avatar leaves the shrub. Finally, we designed an 
experimenter’s monitor (not observed by participants) showing the movements and 
interactions of all ten participants in the environment in real time and allowing 
experimental sessions to be replayed from complete records of participants’ actions 
(Supplementary Videos 2 and 3).    
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 We tested the hypothesis that resource distribution affects fighting behavior 
(defendability theory, Brown, 1964) by manipulating whether resources were distributed 
uniformly or clustered in patches, holding quantity constant. In the patchy condition, 10 
brown shrubs produced 5 berries per minute and 5 green shrubs produced 20 berries per 
minute (total = 150 berries per minute). In the uniform condition, 30 brown shrubs 
produced 5 berries per minute (total = 150 berries per minute). We also tested whether 
participants could resolve resource disputes by using asymmetries in power (created by 
the experimenter) or asymmetries in prior residence. We manipulated power by randomly 
assigning half of participants to be Small avatars, whose strikes cause 3 health points of 
damage, and the other half to be Large avatars, whose strikes cause 5 health points of 
damage. The Large avatars appeared noticeably larger on the screen than the Small 
avatars (Figure 1).  
 
Results 
 We observed more intense fighting in the patchy condition than in the uniform 
condition (Table 1). Participants’ interactions lasted longer and they involved more 
strikes in the patchy condition than in the uniform condition. Participants’ strikes reduced 
their aggregate cash payoffs by an average of $53.80 for (10-participant) sessions in the 
patchy condition versus $7.12 for sessions in the uniform condition. We also observed 
more smiles per interaction in the patchy condition. The Smile option was originally 
included so participants would not think the experimenters expected them to strike. 
Surprisingly, participants frequently used the “cheap talk” smiles and often in extended 
bouts, suggesting use as a low cost threat display. Last, we observed more deaths in the 
patchy condition (11/60) than in the uniform condition (0/60), p < .001, Fisher’s exact 
test. 
 We analyzed whether asymmetries predicted the winner, defined as the avatar 
who remained in the shrub after the other individual exited. In the patchy condition, the 
prior resident defeated the intruder in 71.39% of cases (n = 1,248), significantly greater 
than chance (p < .001, binomial test). When there was a size difference, Large avatars 
tended to defeat Small avatars (66.76%, n = 719, p < .001). When there was a health 
difference, more healthy avatars tended to defeat less healthy avatars (66.37%, n = 1,219, 
p < .001). This initial analysis suggests that humans are able to use several asymmetries 
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to resolve disputes. We observed a different pattern of results in the uniform condition. 
The residence effect was not only reduced, but significant in the opposite direction: Prior 
residents were slightly more likely to be first to exit a shrub (44.31%, n = 589, p = .006). 
Similarly, we observed no size effect (54.84%, n = 341, p = .08) and no health effect 
(49.91%, n = 559, p = 1.00). These results show that in the uniform condition, where 
severe fighting was rare, participants did not generally use asymmetries to decide 
conflicts. Hence, we focused further analysis on disputes in the patchy condition. 
 For the patchy condition, we tested whether fighting behavior differed for 
interactions in brown shrubs (n = 234) and green shrubs (n = 1014). Disputes lasted 
longer (seconds) for green shrubs (M = 4.60, SD = 5.56) than brown shrubs (M = 2.10, 
SD = 1.99), t(1246) = 6.78, p < .001. There were more smiles per interaction for green 
shrubs (M = 2.43, SD = 4.61) than brown shrubs (M = 0.93, SD = 1.60), t(1246) = 4.89, p 
< .001. There were more hits per interaction for green shrubs (M = 0.50, SD = 1.25) than 
brown shrubs (M = 0.05, SD = 0.29), t(1246) = 5.48, p < .001. Additionally, we found 
that asymmetries influenced conflict outcomes in green shrubs but not brown shrubs. For 
green shrubs, we observed a residence effect (75.54%, n = 1,014, p < .001), size effect 
(68.66%, n = 584, p < .001), and health effect (69.35%, n = 995, p < .001). However, for 
brown shrubs, there were no significant effects of residence (53.42%, n = 234, p = .33), 
size (58.52%, n = 178, p = .06), or health (53.13%, n = 224, p = .39). These results show 
that, consistent with theories about resource distribution, fighting is more severe for 
clustered resources, and furthermore, people selectively use asymmetries to resolve 
disputes over severely contested resources but not for less contested resources.  
 To better understand the relative effects of prior residence and fighting 
assessment, we concentrated on disputes over green shrubs. We examined whether the 
residence effect was a byproduct of a tendency for more powerful Large avatars to be 
residents (e.g., see Kemp & Wiklund, 2004; Pryke & Andersson, 2003). Figure 2 shows 
the resident effect by the sizes of resident and intruder (“Small-Large” indicates Small 
resident and Large intruder). When sizes are matched in Large-Large and Small-Small 
interactions, we observed a strong residence effect, showing that this effect cannot be 
reduced to a size/power effect. Additionally, when size differs (Large-Small and Small-
Large), residence significantly affects the frequency of wins for Large avatars (84% vs. 
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46%), χ2(1, n = 584) = 97.85, p < .001. The relative strengths of residence and size 
effects can be compared by considering the Small-Large conflicts in which these two 
asymmetries are opposed. In our environment, neither effect dominated: When Small 
residents faced Large intruders there was no statistical difference in frequencies of 
victory. Further, we predicted that the Small-Large conflicts would be the most severe 
fights precisely because these asymmetries are opposed. Indeed, disputes lasted longer 
for Small-Large interactions (M = 6.36, SD = 5.90) than other types (M = 4.08, SD = 
5.35), f(1, 1010) = 27.04, p < .001, disputes had more smiles for Small-Large interactions 
(M = 3.08, SD = 4.30) than other types (M =2.23, SD = 4.68), f(1, 1010) = 4.93, p = .027, 
and disputes had more hits for Small-Large interactions (M = 0.87, SD = 1.57) than other 
types (M = 0.39, SD = 1.11), f(1, 1010) = 24.44, p < .001.  
 We looked more closely at the mechanics of the residence effect. In non-humans, 
individuals of some species do not contest residence whereas in other species residents 
win because they fight harder (see Kokko et al., 2006). We tested whether the residence 
effect occurred not only in shorter interactions but also in escalated conflicts. We 
categorized interactions as escalated disputes with durations in the top quartile, duration 
> 5 seconds (n = 282), or non-escalated disputes with duration ≤ 5 seconds (n = 732). We 
observed residence effects in escalated disputes (71.99%, p < .001) and non-escalated 
disputes (76.91%, p < .001), and the difference between these proportions was not 
significant, χ2(1, n = 1,014) = 2.67, p = .10. We examined whether residents were willing 
to incur more costs than intruders before giving up a fight over a green shrub. For fight 
duration, participants waited significantly longer before giving up when they were 
residents (M = 5.31, SD = 6.15) than when they were intruders (M = 4.37, SD = 5.34), 
t(1,012) = 2.31, p = .021. For strike costs, participants withstood greater damage in health 
points before giving up when they were residents (M = 2.71, SD = 5.35) than when they 
were intruders (M = 1.30, SD = 3.46), t(1,012) = 4.82, p < .001. Together, these results 
show that the residence effect reflects more than a tendency for intruders to yield, without 
contest, to prior residents. Prior residence shapes not only whether fights escalate but also 
how hard each side fights during an escalated conflict.  
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Logit Model of Resident Wins 
 We used a logit analysis to examine how our experimental manipulation of 
resource distribution affected the residence convention. To estimate how much of the 
resident effect in the patchy condition vis-à-vis uniform condition can and cannot be 
explained by differences in size, hits, and health of the participants, we conducted a 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition on a logit model of resident wins (Fairlie, 2005). The 
percentage of the residence effect that cannot be explained by the observable 
characteristics of the interactions can be attributed to different social processes caused by 
the experimental manipulation of resource distribution. For each interaction, either the 
resident remains in the shrub and the intruder leaves (Y = 1) or vice versa (Y = 0). We 
assume that a set of observable factors x listed in Table 2 explain the decision, so that 
Prob(Y = 1) = Λ(β'x), where Λ(.) is the logistic distribution. The standard Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition of the patchy (P) / uniform (U) gap in the average value of Y can be 
expressed as: 
[ ] [ ]UUPUPPUP xxxYY )ˆˆ()('ˆ ′−+−=− βββ ,     (1) 
where iβˆ is a vector of estimated coefficients for condition i. The first term in brackets is 
the explained difference in resident wins due to the difference in observed characteristics 
in the two conditions, and the second is the unexplained difference due to differences in 
residence conventions. Following Fairlie (2005), the logit decomposition can be written 
as: 
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where ni is the number of observations for condition i.1 Like those of any nonlinear 
regression model, the estimated coefficients are not necessarily the marginal effects. 
Hence, we computed the partial derivatives for the patchy condition (Table 2) and the 
uniform condition (Supplementary Table 1). 
                                                 
1 The results are largely unaffected if we use a probit specification. Equation (2) holds exactly for the logit 
model with a constant term, and hence our choice in reporting that model’s estimates. 
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 Confirming the results reported above, neither resident size nor intruder size 
affect the likelihood that the resident wins (p = .160 and .306, respectively). Each hit by a 
(Small) resident increases the likelihood that the resident wins by 10 percentage points (p 
< .001), and symmetrically each hit by an (Small) intruder reduces the likelihood by 10 
percentage points (p = .001). Moreover, hits by a Large resident and Large intruder have 
larger effects (p = .009 and .002, respectively). The health of residents and intruders have 
expected signs and similar offsetting marginal effects. Also, time in residence (prior to an 
interaction) predicts victory: For every 10 seconds in residence the likelihood of winning 
increases by 2 percentage points (p < .001), a result which has also been found in non-
human species (Alcock & Bailey, 1997; Haley, 1994). Finally, gender and the number of 
smiles for both residents and intruders have no significant effect. All but three of the 
fixed effects for periods are insignificantly different from the baseline of period 20. 
 Residents in the patchy condition maintain ownership of the shrub 71.4% of the 
time (a = .714), whereas only 44.3% of uniform residents retain the shrub (c = .443). Of 
particular interest is how much of this difference can be explained by hits, health, and 
size. We find that nearly exactly half of this difference, a – b = .136 to be precise, can be 
explained by the different observed tendencies and characteristics of the residents and 
intruders. That leaves a rather large amount of the resident effect (b – c = .135) to 
attribute to different social processes caused by the experimental manipulation of 
resource distribution.2 When a valuable resource was concentrated, participants quickly 
(within a 20-minute experiment) adopted a convention of prior residence and that 
explains half of the difference in resident wins between the two treatment conditions. 
 
Discussion 
 Previous research shows that numerous animals—ranging from caterpillars 
(Yack, Smith, & Weatherhead, 2001) to songbirds (Carpenter & MacMillen, 1976) to 
elephant seals (Haley, 1994)—have evolved cognitive mechanisms which adaptively 
manage resource disputes. Importantly, these regulatory mechanisms are not generally 
well-described as “fixed instincts” or as “hardwired,” but oppositely, research reveals 
sophisticated computational control systems which process information about ecological 
variables and specific adversaries to adaptively deploy offensive, defensive, and evasive 
                                                 
2 With a probit specification the estimate of b – c is 53.1% of a – c. 
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maneuvers (reviewed by Kokko et al., 2006; Maher & Lott, 2000). These discoveries 
raise questions about the mental competencies that humans bring to bear on resource 
disputes. Ethnographic studies have investigated the sensitivity of human territoriality to 
key ecological variables (Baker, 2003; Cashden, 1983; Dyson-Hudson & Smith, 1978). 
Also, recent laboratory studies indicate that humans are able to assess fighting ability 
(Sell et al., 2009) and that this information regulates anger toward antagonists (Sell, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009). However, no previous research has applied the standard 
experimental methods from the non-human literature to investigate human fighting 
decisions. 
 We report experimental evidence showing that human fighting decisions are 
sensitive to resource distribution, asymmetries in power, and asymmetries in prior 
residence. The human residence effect shown here is of particular importance given 
centuries of debate about the foundations of human property. We observed an ownership 
convention in an experimental environment which allowed minimal social behavior—
dyadic hitting and smiling—without language use, reputation, or third-party intervention. 
Ownership did not go uncontested, but rather, residents tended to fight harder than 
intruders, and further, participants applied the convention selectively for green shrubs but 
not brown shrubs. This evidence supports recent proposals that the foundation of human 
property is the ability to apply strategic conventions, or “uncorrelated asymmetries” 
(Maynard Smith, 1982), to reduce the costs of severe fighting (Gintis, 2007; Krier, 2009; 
Stake, 2004).  
 Many scholars have argued for the fundamental importance of property in human 
societies (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; De Soto, 2000; Demsetz, 1967; Ellickson, 1991; 
North, 1981; Ostrom, 1990). If humans have specialized cognitive abilities for managing 
resource disputes, then these computational systems shape individual behavior and 
population-level patterns (e.g., Lopez-Sepulcre & Kokko, 2005) like in non-human 
species (Mougeot et al., 2003). This puts a high priority on understanding the cognitive 
competencies behind ownership and how they interact with the complexities of social life 
to generate the human world of “mine” and “thine.”  
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Methods 
 We recruited N = 120 undergraduate participants (50% female) for an hour-long 
experiment, although the actual duration was less than 40 minutes. Participants were paid 
$7 for showing up and they earned additional money as a result of their decisions in the 
experiment (M = $20.09, SD = $8.92). Participants were randomly assigned to one 
experimental condition, either the patchy condition or the uniform condition. There were 
six sessions per experimental condition with ten participants each. Participants were 
taken into the laboratory and seated at computer stations separated by partitions to 
preserve anonymity. Participants were presented with a virtual environment on their 
computer screens. Ten participants were placed together in the same virtual environment. 
They read a set of experimental instructions describing the environment and the 
capabilities of their avatars (Supplementary Methods) and then the experiment began. 
The experiment lasted for 20 periods (one minute each) but participants did not know the 
number of periods in advance in order to eliminate potential end-game effects. After the 
experiment, participants were individually and anonymously paid their show-up payment 
plus experimental earnings and then dismissed. 
Virtual environment software. We designed custom software which creates a 
virtual environment for observing human resource disputes (Supplementary Videos 1-3). 
The software is written in Visual Basic and is available from the authors upon request. In 
the environment, avatars can move to find shrubs, enter/exit shrubs, and consume berries 
inside shrubs. Shrubs produce berries continuously during one minute periods and berries 
that are not consumed disappear at the onset of the next period. Avatars have a health 
meter (0-100 points) which begins at 90 points, decreases through metabolism at a rate of 
-10 points per minute, and increases when berries are consumed. Participants’ cash 
earnings accumulate continuously during the experiment in proportion to their avatar’s 
health (Supplementary Methods). At maximum health, additional berries add “bonus 
points” which increase cash earnings but do not further increase health; this feature was 
designed to limit the health available for fighting to limit health asymmetries. If 
participants reach zero health, then their avatars die, participation in the experiment ends, 
and they receive their accumulated earnings but cannot earn additional money.  
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 Participants cannot see others’ avatars unless two individuals enter the same shrub 
(for discussion, see Maher & Lott, 2000). In this case, the two participants are taken to an 
“interaction” screen. During an interaction, other avatars cannot enter the shrub; clicking 
causes a message indicating that the shrub is full. On the interaction screen, the prior 
occupant is in front of the shrub and the newcomer is shown approaching (Figure 1). 
Each participant has three options: (1) Leave, which causes the avatar to exit the shrub, 
allowing the other avatar to pick berries, (2) Smile, which has no effects aside from 
causing the avatar to smile, and (3) Strike, which causes the avatar to hit the other avatar, 
costing the striker one health point and imposing a greater cost (3 or 5 points) on the 
other individual. After a strike, there is a three second delay before another strike can be 
delivered; this feature was designed to eliminate advantages based on clicking speed. The 
three second strike delay was also imposed at the outset of the interaction to eliminate the 
potential for surprise attacks. Similarly, after a participant exited a shrub, there was a five 
second delay before they could enter the same shrub.  
 The software allows the experimenter to control the number, location, color, and 
productivity of the shrubs as well as the size and capabilities of the avatars. We 
manipulated resource distribution in two experimental conditions (6 sessions each). In the 
patchy condition, there were 10 brown shrubs, which produced 5 berries per minute, and 
5 green shrubs, which produced 20 berries per minute (total = 150 berries per minute). 
After each period, one of the five green shrubs was randomly selected and changed to a 
brown shrub and a corresponding brown shrub changed to a green shrub. This feature 
was designed to increase turnover in residence in green shrubs. In the uniform condition, 
there were 30 brown shrubs which produced 5 berries per minute (total = 150 berries per 
minute). We manipulated power by randomly assigning half of participants to be Small 
avatars, whose strikes cause 3 health points of damage, and the other half to be Large 
avatars, whose strikes cause 5 health points of damage. The Large avatars appeared 
considerably larger on the screen than the Small avatars (Figure 1).  
 The software produces data files which record all of the participants’ actions in 
the virtual environment. During the experiment, participants’ actions are displayed on an 
experimenter’s monitor showing all participants’ avatars in the environment, and 
experimental sessions can be replayed from the data (Supplementary Videos 2 and 3).   
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Table 1         
Session Summary Statistics by Condition 
 Patchy  Uniform   
 M SD  M SD t(10) p  
% of berries extracteda 74 3  57 2 11.99 <.001 
% time moving 46 4  71 2 14.19 <.001 
% time in shrubs 40 4  25 2 8.57 <.001 
% time in interactions 14 2  4 1 15.76 <.001 
# interactions 208 34  98 13 7.46 <.001 
     Time/interaction (sec) 4.24 0.90  2.33 0.34 4.89 <.001 
     Smiles/interaction 2.23 0.84  1.20 0.37 2.75 .021 
     Strikes/interaction 0.43 0.15  0.11 0.09 4.56 .001 
Total strike costs (points) 451 139  52 35 6.80 <.001 
Total strike costs ($) 53.80 20.21  7.12 6.44 5.39 <.001 
Total earnings ($) 226.86 32.73  174.91 9.75 3.73 .0039 
Note. Summary statistics from six experimental sessions in each condition. 
Each of the twelve sessions had ten participants (N = 120).  
aPercentage of the total (3,000) available berries extracted by participants. 
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Table 2      
Patchy Condition: Logit Analysis of Resident Wins  
Variable Coefficient Standard error p  
Hits by resident 0.0995 0.0312 .001  
Smiles by resident -0.0047 0.0063 .451  
Health of resident 0.0020 0.0005 <.001  
Hits by Large resident 0.1357 0.0516 .009  
Hits by intruder -0.1037 0.0313 .001  
Hits by Large intruder -0.1219 0.0387 .002  
Smiles by intruder 0.0103 0.0067 .125  
Health of intruder -0.0016 0.0005 .001  
Time in shrub by resident 0.0021 0.0002 <.001  
Marginal effect for dummy variable is P|1 - P|0  
Large resident 0.0381 0.0271 0.160  
Large intruder -0.0279 0.0272 0.306  
Large resident*Large intruder 0.0247 0.0350 0.480  
Female resident 0.0319 0.0274 0.244  
Female intruder -0.0235 0.0262 0.369  
Female resident*Female intruder -0.0385 0.0418 0.358  
Period1 -0.1011 0.0946 0.285  
Period2 -0.0972 0.0926 0.294  
Period3 -0.1710 0.1107 0.123  
Period4 -0.1092 0.0911 0.231  
Period5 0.0339 0.0505 0.501  
Period6 -0.0497 0.0729 0.496  
Period7 -0.0629 0.0752 0.403  
Period8 -0.0307 0.0675 0.649  
Period9 0.0533 0.0451 0.237  
Period10 0.0632 0.0437 0.148  
Period11 0.0648 0.0414 0.117  
Period12 0.0247 0.0537 0.646  
Period13 0.0761 0.0354 0.032  
Period14 0.0114 0.0537 0.832  
Period15 0.0371 0.0488 0.448  
Period16 -0.0626 0.0814 0.442  
Period17 0.0204 0.0589 0.729  
Period18 0.0741 0.0397 0.062  
Period19 0.0965 0.0345 0.005  
Note. Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of 
characteristics for patchy condition. Values are computed at the means of 
the continuous variables and at zero for all dummy variables (n = 1248). 
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Video 1. Demonstration of virtual environment. The video shows the computer interface 
for the virtual environment as it was experienced by participants. It shows a Small avatar 
moving to find shrubs and consume berries. It also shows the avatar in interactions with 
others and using smiles and strikes.   
 
Video 2. Experimenter’s monitor for patchy condition. The video shows a monitor of 
participants’ actions in the virtual environment as observed by the experimenter (not the 
participants). It shows actual data replayed from session 1 of the patchy condition.  
 
Video 3. Experimenter’s monitor for uniform condition. The video shows a monitor of 
participants’ actions in the virtual environment as observed by the experimenter (not the 
participants). It shows actual data replayed from session 1 of the uniform condition.  
 
 
 
Video Download Links  
 
WMV Format:  
Video 1: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PropertyDemoA.wmv 
Video 2: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PatchySession1.wmv 
Video 3: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/UniformSession1.wmv 
 
 
MP4 Format: 
Video 1: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PropertyDemoA.mp4 
Video 2: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PatchySession1.mp4 
Video 3: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/UniformSession1.mp4 
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Figure 1. Interaction between avatars. The screenshot shows the perspective of a Small resident who is 
having an interaction with a Large intruder. The participant controls the avatar by clicking on one of the 
three buttons showing strike, smile, or leave.  
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Figure 2. Resident and intruder wins by resident-intruder sizes for disputes over green shrubs in the patchy 
condition. Residents have significantly more wins in fights that are Large-Large (n = 240, p < .001, 
binomial test), Large-Small (n = 352, p < .001), and Small-Small (n = 190, p < .001). For Small-Large 
fights, the difference between Small residents and Large intruders is not significant (n = 232, p = .21). 
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Supplementary Table 1.  Uniform Condition: Logit Analysis of Resident Wins 
 
Supplementary Table 1      
Uniform Condition: Logit Analysis of Resident Wins  
Variable Coefficient Standard error p  
Hits by resident 0.2169 0.1866 0.245  
Smiles by resident 0.0622 0.0383 0.104  
Health of resident 0.0034 0.0017 0.043  
Hits by Large resident 0.1278 0.2411 0.596  
Hits by intruder -0.0126 0.2155 0.953  
Hits by Large intruder -0.5105 0.2467 0.039  
Smiles by intruder -0.1636 0.0313 0.000  
Health of intruder -0.0016 0.0017 0.349  
Time in shrub by resident 0.0482 0.0079 0.000  
Marginal effect for dummy variable is P|1 - P|0  
Large resident 0.0835 0.0672 0.214  
Large intruder 0.0232 0.0640 0.717  
Large resident*Large intruder 0.0269 0.0962 0.780  
Female resident 0.1372 0.0688 0.046  
Female intruder 0.0358 0.0712 0.614  
Female resident*Female intruder -0.1544 0.0890 0.083  
Period1 -0.3540 0.0810 0.000  
Period2 -0.2172 0.1267 0.087  
Period3 -0.0048 0.1540 0.975  
Period4 -0.0929 0.1478 0.530  
Period5 -0.1600 0.1364 0.241  
Period6 -0.2516 0.1120 0.025  
Period7 -0.2445 0.1170 0.037  
Period8 -0.1120 0.1590 0.481  
Period9 -0.1206 0.1350 0.372  
Period10 -0.1420 0.1263 0.261  
Period11 -0.0474 0.1328 0.721  
Period12 -0.0993 0.1293 0.442  
Period13 -0.1964 0.1144 0.086  
Period14 -0.1293 0.1255 0.303  
Period15 0.0114 0.1282 0.929  
Period16 0.0418 0.1331 0.754  
Period17 0.1389 0.1289 0.282  
Period18 0.1396 0.1401 0.319  
Period19 -0.1560 0.1208 0.197  
Note. Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of 
characteristics for uniform condition. Values are computed at the means of 
the continuous variables and at zero for all dummy variables (n = 589). 
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Supplementary Methods. Experiment Instructions for Large Avatar 
 
<page 1> 
Welcome 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple, 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you can earn a considerable 
amount of money which will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment. 
 
In this experiment, you will be represented by the avatar you see in the middle of the 
screen.  You and the 9 other people in the experiment each have the ability to move 
around the environment, enter shrubs, and pick berries.  The experiment will consist of 
many periods each lasting 60 seconds. 
 
<page 2> 
Movement 
You can move around the environment by left clicking on the spot you wish to move to 
(try clicking in the grassy area now).  Notice that a red X marks the spot your avatar is 
moving towards.  You can see shrubs in the environment, but you cannot see the other 
people who are also moving in the same environment. 
 
In the top left portion of the screen there is a mini map that displays the environment 
including the location of the shrubs you have discovered and your current location 
represented by a black square.  Areas of the environment that you have not yet visited are 
blacked out. Try moving around to see how the mini map works. 
 
You can also enter and exit the shrubs in the environment.  Move around until you find a 
shrub. Move your avatar completely on top of one of the shrubs and stop.  Once your 
avatar stops on a shrub you enter it and a new screen appears showing the shrub in an 
expanded view. 
 
<page 3> 
Inside a Shrub 
You can earn points and money by picking berries inside the shrubs.  
 
During a period, shrubs grow berries.  The berries remain in the shrub until the end of the 
period.  At the end of the period, any remaining berries will disappear and new berries 
will begin to grow. 
 
To pick a berry, left click on it (try this now). Each berry is worth 1 point. The points you 
get will be added to your health points. If you reach the maximum 100 health points, then 
your points will go into your bonus points. The points you get will determine your cash 
earnings, which we will explain shortly. 
 
Green shrubs produce more berries, and brown shrubs produce less berries. Depending on 
the environment, you might find all green, all brown, or a mixture of green and brown 
shrubs. To exit a shrub, click on the exit button: 
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in the top right area of your screen. 
 
<page 4> 
Interaction 
If you are in a shrub and another person attempts to enter the same shrub, then both of 
you will be involved in an interaction.  You will see a new screen with your avatar in 
front of the shrub and another person who has approached the shrub.  Both people will 
have three options:  
 
 
Smile at the other person 
 
Strike the other person 
 
Leave the shrub 
 
If you strike the other person, you will reduce your own health points by 1 point(s) and 
you will cause the other person to lose 5 health points. Larger avatars cause more damage 
per strike than smaller avatars.  
 
This interaction will continue until one person leaves the shrub. The remaining person 
can go back to picking berries.  You cannot enter a shrub in which two people are already 
having an interaction.  
 
(Interactions will be disabled until the experiment starts.)  
 
<page 5> 
Earnings and Your Health 
Your health will decrease over time.  Think of it as metabolism.  Every 6 seconds your 
health points will go down by one point.   
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NOTE: If your health falls to zero, then your avatar will die and your participation in the 
experiment will end.  
 
Each second your health points are multiplied by 0.0002 and added to your Earnings.  For 
example, when your health is 25, you are earning 31.25 cents per minute.  When your 
health is 75, you are earning 93.75 cents per minute. Each berry picked as a bonus is 
worth 25 cents and added to your earnings when the berry is picked.  If you die by 
reaching zero health points, then you stop earning money. 
 
<page 6> 
Summary 
This is the end of the instructions.  The important points are: 
 
(1) Berries add to your health points. Once you reach maximum health, they give you 
bonus points. 
 
(2) When someone enters a shrub with another person in it, an interaction screen will 
appear. During an interaction, both people can: 
 
 
Smile 
 
 
Strike 
 
 
Leave 
 
Striking others and being hit by others reduces your health. 
 
(3) If your health points fall to 0, then your avatar will die, and you can no longer 
earn money in this session. 
 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer 
them.  If you are finished with the instructions please press Start.  The instructions will 
remain on your screen until everyone is ready and the experiment starts.  Your health 
points will reset to 90 when the experiment begins. 
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